The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior: An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final-Offer Arbitration by Henry S. Farber & Max H. Bazerman
NBER WORKINGPAPER SERIES
THEGENERAL BASIS OF ARBITRATOR





Working Paper No. i.88




This paper was written while Farber was a fellow at the Center For
Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. Farber received support
for this research from the National Science Foundation under grants
Nos. SES—82OT103 and BNS 16—22943 and from the Sloan Foundation as
an Alfred P. Sloan Research Fellow. Bazerman received support for
this research from the National Science Foundation under grant No.
BNS 8l—OT331. Useful comments were received from participants in
workshops at U.C. Berkeley, U.C. Irvine, U.C. Los Angeles, M.I.T.
and Stanford University. The research reported here is part of the
NBER's research program in Labor Studies. Any opinions expressed
are those of the authors and not those of the National Bureau of
Economic Research.NBER Working Paper *1488
November 1984
The General Basis of Arbitrator Behavior:
An Empirical Analysis of Conventional and Final—Offer Arbitration
ABSTRACT
A general model of arbitrator behavior in conventional and final—offer
arbitration is developed that is based on an underlying notion of an
appropriate award in a particular case. This appropriate award is defined as
a function of the facts of the case independently of the offers of the
parties.In conventional arbitration the arbitration award is argued to be a
function of both the offers of the parties and the appropriate award. The
weight that the arbitrator puts on the appropriate award relative to the
offers is hypothesized to be a function of the quality of the offers as
measured by the difference between the offers.In final—offer arbitration it
is argued that the arbitrator chooses the offer that is closest to the
appropriate award.
The model is implemented empirically using data gathered from practicing
arbitrators regarding their decisions in twenty—five hypothetical cases. The
estimates of the general model strongly support the characterizations of
arbitrator behavior in the two schemes. No substantial differences were found
in the determination of the appropriate award implicit in the conventional
arbitration decisions and the determination of the appropriate award implicit
in the final—offer decisions.
HenryS. Farber Max H. Bazerman
Department of Economics Sloan School of Management
Massachusetts Institute cf TechnologyMassachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge,MA02139 Cambridqe MA 02139I. Introduction
Of central importance in the process of collective bargaining is the
mechanism for settling disputes that arise when the parties fail to reach
agreement when negotiating a labor contract.It determines not only the terms
of agreement in all cases but also the probability of reaching agreement
without resort to the dispute settlement mechanism.1 While the strike is the
dominant mode for settling disputes that arise in the course of negotiating
labor contracts, arbitration procedures have become particularly important in
areas, such as the public sector, where strikes are deemed to be too
disruptive. These procedures are characterized by a third party making a
binding decision. In addition, arbitration procedures, though called by
different names, are used to settle disputes in a wide range of areas For
example, litigation of civil disputes is analogous to bargaining with
arbitration as the dispute settlement mechanism. 1n out—of—court settlement
is simply a negotiated settlement while an award by a judge or jury is
essentially an arbitration award2
The willingness of the parties to make concessions in order to reach a
negotiated settlement is based largely on what they expect to receive if they
do not reach agreement. In the case of arbitration, the parties' expectations
regarding the outcome in the event of failure to reach a negotiated settlement
depend heavily on their expectations regarding the behavior of the arbitrator.
1. Farber and Katz (1979) and Farber (1900) deveiop models of the
negotiation process under the threat of arbitration that highlight the role of
the expected arbitration award.
2 Of course, the details of the process are quite different. For
example, in most labor arbitration schemes the offers made by the parties in
an attempt to reach settlement are admissible as evidence before the
arbitrator, However, in civil litigation, pretrial offers to settle are not
admissible as evidence. This difference can have profound effects on the
bargaining process. See, for example, Wheeler (1977) and Farber (1981).Thus, our ability to understand the effects of anarbitrationscheme on the
collective barnaining process without understanding the decision processesof
the arbitrators themselves is quite limited. However, therehas been little
in the way of systematic analysis of how arbitrators actuallydecide.
In this study two types of arbitration schemes are considered.The
first is called conventional arbitration where arbitrators arefree to impose
any settlement they see fit. Thesecond is called final—offer arbitration
where arbitrators are constrained to make an award thatis equal to either the
union final offer or the management finaloffer.4 While the use of
conventional arbitration arbitration has been increasing, criticshave argued
that arbitrators tend to "split the difference" between the offersof the
parties resulting in a "chilling" of bargaining andexcessive reliance on the
arbitrator to reach agreement.5 This may occur as the parties maintain polar
positions in order to influence the arbitration award mostfavorably.6 Final—
3. Exceptions to this are Ashenfelter and Bloom (1984), Bazerman (in
press), and Bazerman and Farber (in press).
4. There are many variants of final offer arbitration. For example, where
there is more than one issue in dispute, the arbitrator may be constrainedto
award the entire package of one party or the other or the arbitrator may be
free to choose final offers on an issue by issue basis. Anothervariant of
final—offer arbitration, used for public employees in Iowa, gives the
arbitrator the third option of awarding the recommendation of a "neutral"
third party (Gallagher and Chaubey, 1982).In this study we consider only the
case where there is a single issue in dispute, and we usethe simple
conception of final—offer arbitration where the arbitrator hastwo discrete
options.
5. Wheeler (1978) and Kochan and Baderschneider (1978) present evidence
regarding the diffusion of conventional arbitration schemes. Feigenbaum
(1975), Feuille (1975), Northrup (1966), Stevens (1966), Starkeand Notz
(1981), Bonn (1972), and Anderson and Kochan (1977) present argumentsthat
arbitrators split the difference in conventional arbitration resulting in a
"chilling" of bargaining.
6. Farber (1981) presents a theoretical model of arbitrator and negotiator
behavior in conventional arbitration with implications for the pure split—the--
difference model. Bazerman and Farber (in press) present an empirical
analysis of arbitrator behavior that addresses the issue of spiitting—theoffer arbitration was developed in response to this criticism of conventional
arbitration.
Careful analysis of the relative merits of alternative arbitration
schemes requires comparisons in at least two dimensions. The first is the
frequency with which the procedures induce the parties to reach a negotiated
settlement without resort to an arbitrator. The second is the quality of both
negotiated and arbotrated settlements. Virtually all existing work comparing
conventional and final—offer arbitration has focused on settlement frequency,
probably because the driving force behind the adoption of final—offer
arbitration was the arguement that it is more conducive than conventional
arbitration to negotiated settlemets.7 Another important reason for this
focus is that there has been no clear standard, constant across different
forms of arbitration, that can serve as a basis for Judging thequality of
settlements.
It is argued in this study that there is a construct, called the
1appropriate award1 implicit in the behavior of arbitrators that is
independent of the particular type of arbitration and that is a natural
standard for judging the quality of settlements. The central hypothesis is
that arbitrators make decisions in the different types of arbitration schemes
based on the same underlying appropriate award. The appropriate award is
argued to be a function of the facts of a given situation independent o-f the
offers of the parties.8 It is a representation of what the arbitrator would
difference directly.
7. See, for example1 Kochan and Baderschenider (1978), Neale and Bazerman
(1983), and Notz and Starke (197B)
8. Throughout this study the "facts of the case' refer to all
considerations with the exception of the positions of the parties. In
general, the facts can be considered to be exogenous to the bargaining process
while the offers of the parties clearly cannot be consideredexogenous.4
award based on an unbiased" examination of the facts without any knowledge of
or consideration of the offers. is such to the extent that the appropriate
award is a stable and qeneralizable construct across different arbitration
schemes, it can serve an important role as a basis for evaluating outcomes
(both neqotiated and arbitrated) that are reached under the threat of
arbitration of various types. The plan of this study is to devlop a model of
arbitrator behavior n conventional and final—offer arbitration based on the
appropriate award and to implement this model empirically in order to
determine whether the construct of an appropriate award, in fact, generalizes
across types of arbitration.
The next section contains the development of a simple model of
arbitrator decision making in conventional arbitration where it is argued that
the arbitration award is a weighted average of the appropriate award and the
offers of the parties. The weights are argued to be systematically related to
the quality of the offers as measured by how close to agreement the parties
are.9 Section IIIcontainsthe development of a simple model of arbitrator
decision making in final—offer arbitration where it is argued that the
arbitrator chooses the offer that is closest to the arbitrator's notion of an
appropriate award.
The key to the empirical analysis is the investigation of how close the
appropriate award implicit in the conventional arbitration award is to the
appropriate award implicit in the final offer arbitration decision. Of
course, only the actual arbitration awards are observable. The appropriate
9. This model has as a special case the pure split—the—difference model of
arbitrator behavior that serves as the basis of the critique of conventional
arbitration. The empirical implementation of this model will shed light on
the extent to which the arbitrator splits—the—difference as opposed to
fashioning an award based on the facts of the case.C
awardis directly observable in neither type of arbitration so that the
investiatjon must be based on a structural model that relates the actual
arbitration award in each type of arbitration both to the facts of the case as
they are hypothesized to affect the appropriate award and to the offers of the
parties. The empirical test is based on the deqree of correspondence between
the observed and unobserved determinants of the appropriate awards in the two
types of arbitration.
What are needed are data on the decisions of arbitrators in both
conventional and final—offer settings along with the facts of the particular
case and the offers of the parties. However, data related to arbitrators'
decisions in actual cases of the sort generally analyzed have serious
limitations for the problem at hand. First it is rare that explicit last
offers are recorded in situations where conventional arbitration is utilized.
Second, actual cases do not include both conventional and final—offer awards
in the same situations. Finally, the facts available to the arbitrator are
generally incompletely observed by the investigator. This is crucial because
all facts available to the arbitrator, including those the investigator does
not observe, will affect the offers of the parties as they attempt to
influence the arbitration award favorably.10 These shortcomings are critical
because the analysis relies fundamentally on identifying the role of the facts
available to the arbitrator from the role of the offers in the determination
of the arbitration award.
In light of these shortcomings, the models of arbitrator behavior are
implemented empirically using data gathered from practicing arbitrators who
10. Farber (1930, 1961) develops models of strategic behavior in
conventional and final—offer arbitration where the offers are manipulated by
the parties as they attempt to maximize the value of the outcome.6
wereeach asked to decide the same set of twenty—fivehypotheticalcases.
Eoth conventional and final—offer arbitration awards were recorded from each
arbitrator for each case.In the simulation exercise used here, the
arbitrators were qiven a precisely controlled set of information regarding the
facts of each case along with information regarding the offers of the parties.
All of the variation in the facts is measured in the data. Thus, the
information set of the arbitrator is completely characterized bythe observed
facts of the case, and the last offers are available for usein analyzing the
conventional as well as the final—offer arbitration awards. Thefact that
each arbitrator provided both conventional and final—offer awardsin all
situations is another advantage of these data because it facilitatesthe
estimation of the correlation between unobservable factors that affectthe
determination of an appropriate award by a given arbitrator in a particular
case. This correlation will prove to be an important partof the empirical
analysis given that the facts and the offers do not explainall of the
variation in arbitration awards.
In section IV the design of the simulation exercise is discussed and the
resulting sample is described. Section V contains the empirical
specifications of the models of arbitrator choice along with adiscussion of
some conceptual issues that have implications for theeconometric
specification. An unconstrained model that allows for completelydifferent
determinants of the appropriate award in the two types of arbitration is
proposed. At the same time it allows for correlation betweenunobserved
factors that affect the appropriate awards in the two types of arbitration.A
fully constrained model is also proposed where it is assumed that the
appropriate award is determined in exactly the same way in both types of
arbitration is also proposed. Finally, two partially constrained models are7
proposed, the estimates of which will shed additional liQht on how the
appropriate awards might differ across arbitration schemes.
In section VI the various models are estimated using the data from the
simulated arbatratians.It is found that the determinants of the apprbpriate
awards are remarkably similar. All of the parameters determining the
appropriate award in conventional arbitration are very close to the parameters
determining the appropriate award in final—offer arbitration..At the same
time the unobserved factors affecting the appropriate awards are very highly
correlated. While it is possible to reject the hypothesis that the
appropriate awards are identical, there seems to be no substantive difference
across types of arbitration.
The final section contains a brief summary of the findings as well as a
discussion of their implications for the evaluation of arbitration schemes and
the role of arbitration in the collective bargaining process.
II. Arbitrator Behavior in Conventional Arbitration
Consider an arbitrator who must make a decision regarding a single issue
such as the wage change to prevail in a collective bargaining agreement.11
While it is not possible to characterize completely the objectives of the
arbitrator, one possible motivation far arbitrators is that they attempt to
make awards that maximize the probability they will be hired in subsequent
cases, either by the same parties or by others who are aware of their
performance. The process by which arbitrators are selected +or cases varies
11. Where there is mare than one issue to be decided, the details of the
analysis become mare complicated but its qualitative nature is unchanged for
the purposes of this study.8
across settinqs, but it is qenerally truethat both parties have a limited
veto power. For example, New Jersey's statutory procedurefor selection of
arbitrators in disputes involving police and firemen requiresthat the New
Jersey Public Employment Relation Commission present alist of seven potential
arbitrators to the parties, each of whom is instructed toveto three names and
indicate their preference ranking over the remainingfour.12 Clearly,
selection procedures such as this provide the incentivefor the arbitrator to
avoid making awards are that are unacceptable toeither party. Naintaining
acceptability with both parties affects thearbitrator's general professional
reputation and the frequency with which he orshe will be hired in the future.
The arbitrator who is attempting to establish a generalprofessional
reputation will want to maintain acceptabilityboth in terms of the offers of
the parties and the facts of the case. Such a reputationcannot be
established by making an award that simply avoids a settlementthat is too far
away from either party's final offer. Thearbitrator's professional
reputation is also affected by the degree to whichhis/her settlements are
known to be consistent with the facts of the case. Evidenceconsistent with
this view is provided by Bloom and Cavanaugh (1984), whofind that the
preferences of the union and the employer regardingappropriate arbitrators in
specific cases are not in direct opposition.The interpretation of this is
that certain arbitrators are successful at being perceived asfair and are
more likely to be ranked highly by both unionand management in particular
cases.
A behavioral rule for the arbitrator consistent withthe preceding
12. This procedure is described by Bloom and Cavanaugh (1984),who present
an analysis of the preferences of the parties acrossarbitrators.9
arquinent is that the arbitrator makes an award that ninimizesthesue of
squared deviations of the award from each partys last offer (V and V for
U m
union and management respectively) and each partys notion of an appropriate
award (Vand 'em for union and management respectively). These appropriate
awards are assumed to be determined by a set of economic and political factors
(the facts) that are not influenced directly by the parties' behavior,. The
lonc function (V) associated with this decision rule is
(1) y =[LX(Y-Y )+(1-LX) (V -V )LJ+ (1-)l(Y-Y )L+(1_&) (V _y )L)
sem s eu 5 in su
where V represents the arbitration award. The parameters LX and & are fixed
weights. The parameter )'representsthe weight put on deviations from the
parties notions of an appropriate award relative to deviations from the
offers.
It seems reasonable to argue that the weight (1)onthe facts relative
to the offers is a function of the quality of the offers.If the offers are
close together, the indication is that the parties are close to agreement and
the offers become of primary importance (1 is small) in determining what
outcomes are acceptable. On the other hand, if the offers are farther apart,
the penalty to the arbitrator for deviation from the offers is likely to be
smaller so that the facts become of primary importance ( is large). More
formally,
(2) =q(Y—V)
where g(4) is a monotonically increasing function of its argument.
The optimal (loss minimizing) arbitration award based on these
considerations is
() =y+()-)(Y +(1-)Y
s e in u
where V is the weighted average of the management and union notions of an
appropriate award. This is1 ()
(4) Y cY +(l—c)Y e em eu
This quantity (Y) is called here the arbitrator'snotion of an appropriate
award. The value of V has normative appeal to theextent that it summarizes
the arbitrators interpretation and synthesis ofthe needs of the parties as a
function of the economic and political environment.In a limited sense it
represents the ideal award.
The key resultisthatthe opti mal awardfor the arbitratorto make isa
weighted average of the appropriate award 'e'based on the facts and the
offers of the parties where the weight () depends onthe quality of the
offers. This characterization of the arbitrationaward is intuitively
plausible, and it need not depend on the specificparameterization of the
optimization process outlined here.
The optimal arbitration award defined in equation(3) has a number of
interesting special cases. First, if'1then only the facts are important
and the arbitrator ignores the offers. Second, if 10and 6=1/2 then the
arbitrator simply splits the difference between the offersof the parties
without regard to the facts. Third, a more general split—the--differencemodel
is the special case where 10 but 6 is unconstrained. Finally,the notion
that the weight on V relative to the offers is a functionof the quality of
the offers can be tested by assuming an appropriately generalspecification
for '.Allof these special cases are tested using the estimatesof the model
presented below.11
III. Arbitrator Behavior in Final—Offer Arbitration
In final—offer arbitration the arbitrator is constrained to make an
award that is equal to the union final offer or the management final offer.
No compromise is allowed. Suppose that the arbitrator must choose between
final offers specifying a single issue, such as the wage change to prevail in
a collective bargaining agreement.1 Assume that the underlying motivation of
the arbitrator in final offer arbitration is identical to the motivation in
conventional arbitration: to maximize the probability of being hired in the
future. However, the arbitrator must signal the quality of the award simply
by the choice of one offer or the other. The problem for the arbitrator is to
decide which offer is more likely to be deemed acceptable. This requires an
evaluation of the offers in the context of the relevant facts regarding the
economic and political environment.In more formal terms, the arbitrator in
final—offer arbitration can be conceived of as selecting the offer that
minimizes the value of some loss function. However, there is no reason to
believe that the appropriate loss function in final—offer arbitration is the
same loss function that is appropriate in conventional arbitration. The
structure of the process is quite different, and the offers play very
different roles in the two types of arbitration.
Assume that the loss function of the arbitrator in final—offer
arbitration is a weighted sum of squared deviations of the selected offer only
from the appropriate outcomes of the parties (YandY) and not from the
em
13. As discussed in the introduction, where there is more than one issue
in dispute, final—offer arbitration can take on a number of different forms.
By assuming that a single issue is in dispute, the definition and analysis of
final—offer arbitration is simplified without losing the central features of
the process. See Crawford (1979) for an interestinq analysis of negotiation
under the threat of arbitration where there is more than one issue in dispute.1')
theoffers.'4 This loss function is
2
(5) V =(V—V )+(1—c(Y —Y ).
sem s eu
Since the arbitrator is constrained to impose one or the other of the offers
as the award, the optimal award from the arbitrator's pointof view is the
offer that yields the lower value for the loss function defined in equation
(5).It is straightforward to derive the result that the management's offer
will be selected if and only if
(6) (V +V )/2 < V
u in a
where V is defined in equation (4) as the arbitrator's notionof an
e
appropriate award. This result has the intuitively appealing interpretation
15,16
that the arbitrator selects the offer that is closest to Y
e
In summary1 arbitration awards in both conventional and final—offer
arbitration depend on the offers a common underlying variable called the
14. It would be odd for the squared deviations of the award from the
offers to enter directly in the loss function in final—offer arbitration
because the arbitrator must select one offer or the other. The contribution
to the loss function would always be zero from the offer selected and the
weighted square of the difference between the offers for the offernot
selected. Indeed, if the weights are equal (i.e., &1/2 in equation 3) then
the contribution to the loss function from this source would be independentof
the arbitration award.
15. A more general characterization of arbitrator choice in final—offer
arbitration is that the arbitrator does not weight deviations from V bythe
management and union equally. This is equivalent to assuming thatte
arbitrator compares V to an arbitrary weighted average of the offers.While
not presented in this study, estimates of such a model yield virtually no
improvement in the fit, and the hypothesis that the weights are equal(1/2)
cannot be rejected at any reasonable level of significance. This is
equivalent to the result reported by Ashen-Felter and Bloom(1984).
16. If it is assumed that in final—offer arbitration the arbitrator
minimizes the same loss function that was minimized in conventional
arbitration, the optimal award in final—offer arbitration is the offerthat is
closest to the optimal award in conventional arbitration defined in equation
(3). Empirical implementation of this alternative formulation leads to the
conclusion that the relationship in (6) is an adequate characterization of the
arbitrator's decision rule in final—offer arbitration.Indeed, for specific
values of 'and6 (Y=1 or 61/2) it can be shown that the alternative
formulation collapses to the decision rule defined in (6).13
appropriate award (Y). In conventional arbitration the award is a weighted
average of and the offers where the weiahts depend on the quality of the
offers while in final—offer arbitration the award is the offer that is
closest to V
e
IV. The Data: Desian oftheSimulation and Characteristics of the Sample
The models developed in this study are implemented empirically using
data collected from a set of simulations administered to practicing
arbitrators. The simulation materials were sent out to the entire membership
of the National Academy of Arbitrators (NAA) and the participants in a
regional meeting of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). Each
arbitrator was asked to judge twenty—five hypothetical interest arbitration
cases where the only remaining unresolved issue was wages. They were asked to
provide the wage award for a contract of one year duration that they would
make under a conventional arbitration scheme. They were also asked to provide
the offer that they would select in a final—offer arbitration scheme. Along
with their judgments in the twenty—five cases each arbitrator was asked to
supply information regarding his or her background and experience.
Arbitrators were required to supply their names and addresses with their
response only if they wished to receive a copy of the results. Anonymity was
guaranteed, and responses were sent back in a provided business reply
envelope.
Of 584setsof materials mailed, sixty—four arbitrators provided usable
responses. A total of 1522 usable arbitration decisions from the sixty—four
arbitrators were obtained and are used in the subsequent analysis.17 The mean
17. j n .vprr cc7,7(nut n+ 2 ooEabi) vaidrnnn,ner14
age of the response group was 59 years, and all but twoof the respondents
were male)8 The mean number of interest arbitration cases that had been
heard by members of the response group was 29, while the the mean number of
arbitration cases of all sorts that had been heard was 886. Unfortunately,
there exists no comprehensive survey of members of the NAA that could be used
to determine if the response group is representative of the population of
arbitrators as a whole However, some ongoing research by Helburn and Rogers
(personal communication, 1983), who obtained 286 responses to a survey ofNAA
members (a response rate in excess of 50 percent) that required far less time
from participants, presents an interesting contrast. Their sample had an
average age of 60.5 years. The mean number of interest arbitration cases
heard by their respondents was 13.1, and the mean number of total arbitration
cases heard by their respondents was 295.3. Thus, the smaller number of
respondents to the survey used in the current study had a very similar mean
age to this large sample. At the same time, the current sample possesses
significantly more experience in arbitration of both types. This is
consistent with the notion that arbitrators self—selected at least in part on
the basis of interest arbitration experience. It is also likely that those
who responded were those who felt most comfortable making an award on the
basis of the information provided and who believe that the salient features of
a real collective bargaining situation can be captured in a simulation. Itis
difficult to speculate about the effect that these selection criteria might
arbitrator. Some arbitrators responded only to some of the scenarios, and
some responses were deleted due to obvious errors on the part of the
respondents in writing their award.
18. The mean characteristics of the respondents are based on the sixty of
the sixty—four arbitrators who provided their personal characteristics along
with their judgments.15
have on the results.
The simulations are cast in the private sector despite the fact that
most experience in the United States with interest arbitration is in the
public sector. One important reason is that there is more room for presenting
cases to the arbitrators that are diverse in the sense that they are located
in different settings while at the same time controlling the relevant factors
in a precise manner. For example, in the private sector there are a large
variety of industries and occupations that can be incorporated into the
scenarios. In the public sector there is only one industry by definition, and
the number of occupations is quite limited. The scenarios used here are much
more likely to be effective in manipulating the facts from the arbitratars
perspective if the industrial and occupational settings differ sharply from
case to case. Arbitrators may be more prone within an industry or the public
sector to make comparisons (implicit or explicit) between scenarios that are
unintended from the researcher's point of view and destructive of the
analysis. Overall, we would further argue that the sort of decision processes
that are the focus of this analysis generalize beyond the particular sector.
The forces that influence arbitrator behavior are likely to be similar, and
much can be learned about arbitrator behavior in general from examination of
the particular scenarios used here.
In order to maintain parallelism between cases while providing necessary
diversity, twenty—five industries were identified that had varying average
national wages in 1980. These national wages were adjusted very slightly to
create a systematic pattern of twenty—five national wages that varied from
.40 ,.45,.50,...1.55,1.60times$8.66, where $8.66 was the mean of all
twenty—five actual national industry average wages. These adjusted national
wages were used as a basis for the computation of some of the factors as16
described below.Two additional criteria were used in selecting the
particular values for each factor. First, it was desired that the scenarios
develop wage increases rather than wage declines. Second, it was necessary
for the union's final offer exceed that of the management for obvious reasons
in all scenarios.
Along with information on the national wage, each scenario contained
iiITL'IHID.UU WI YII
— Theinflation rate was stated to be 77., 97.,117.,137.,or157..
—Theaverage wage increase of other contracts in the industry was stated to
be 6'!., 6%,10%,127., or 147.,
—Theaverage local wage for similarly qualified employees was stated to be
equal to the average national wage in the industry times 87%, 94%, 101%,
108%, or 115%.
The present wage was stated to be equal to the average national wage times
96.5%, 98%, 99.5%, 1017.,or102.5%.
—Thefinancial health of the firm was stated to be terrible, poor, fair,
good, or excellent.19
—Management'sfinal offer was stated to be equal to the average national
wage in the industry times 1047., 105.5%, 107%, 108.5%, or 110%.
—Union'sfinal offer was stated to be equal to the average national wage in
the industry times 111.5%, 113%, 114.5%, 116%, or 117.5%.
Each of the twenty—five hypothetical cases was described in a paragraph
19. This is the only one of the factors that is qualitative rather than
quantitative. The reason is that there is no clear measure of financial
health that could generalize across industries and would be familiar to
arbitrators. For example, a 'good" rate of profit varies considerably across
industries. The empirical specification takes account oftheordinal nature
of this measure.17
in terms of the seven criterion factors. The scenarios were designed to
ensure orthogonality between factors with regard to the underlying ordinal
rankings. In the total set of twenty—five cases there were 'five cases for
each of the five levels of each factor.21 While the cases were presented to
each arbitrator in the same sequence, this sequence was chosen randomly with
respect to the factors that were manipulated. This was done in order to
minimi,c+h nnih1iv fh.+- fh rrdr n fh wruild ,r 1&inr fh
decisions.The following is an example of a simulated case.
Situation 18
In a town of 102,000 people, workers with similar skills and
backgrounds to the employees of this radio and broadcasting
company were paid $8.31/hr., while the national wage in this
industry was $8.23/hr. The financial outlook for this company
is fair in light of the 117. inflation rate. The present
average wage for this company's union is $8.44/hr. Contract
negotiations have reached an impasse. Both sides, however,
have agreed to submit final offers to you, the arbitrator, and
to be bound by your decision for a period of one year.
Comparable pay increases from collective bargaining agreements
in the industry are running about 87.thisyear. Management's
final offer is $6.56 (a 1.47. increase) and the union's final
offer is $9.55 (a 13.27. increase>.
There is considerable variation in the responses of the arbitrators
within particular cases. The standard deviation of the percent wage increase
awarded by the arbitrator in conventional arbitration in a particular case is
never below 1.1 percentage points and it is generally much larger. The
maximum is approximately 2.7 percentage points. The average standard
20. This design was selected for the purposes of other research using the
same data. See Bazerman (in press). This design does not imply exact
orthogonality with regard to the actual levels of the factors. Interested
readers can contact the authors for more information.
21. Ofcourse,this does not exhaust all of he possible interactions
between factors. There are a total of 78125 (5 ) possible combinations of
the five levels of seven factors, and there are many sets oftwenty—fivecases
with the desired properties. The set selected is arbitrary in this regard.18
deviation across the twenty—five cases is approximately 1.75 percentage
points.Similarly, there isconsiderable variation in the final offer awards
withinparticular cases. There was ar average of 61 responses perscenario
(1522/25), and in only two scenarios did all of the responding arbitrators
select the same final offer.In only eleven of the twenty—five scenarios did
fewer than five arbitrators select a particular offer. Thus,arbitrators
differ substantially in their evaluation of any particularscenario in both
types of arbitration, and these differences maybe a major source of the
uncertainty that has been argued to drive collective bargainingwhere
arbitration is the dispute settlement mechanism (Farber and Katz, 1979;
Farber, 1980, 1981).
The empirical analysis of arbitration awards is based on the
proportional wage increase awarded by the arbitrators. This canbe
approximated by the difference between the logarithm of the wagelevel awarded
and the logarithm of the present wage.On this basis the relevant form for
the explanatory variables that measure wages are as log differences fromthe
present wage. The only variables that do not measure wages or proportional
changes are the variables measuring the financial conditionof the company.
Two dichotomous variables were created to measure variation in thisdimension.
The first (CONDB) equals one if the financial condition of the firm was
terrible or poor, and it equals zero otherwise. The second (CONDO) equals one
if the financial condition of the firm was good or excellent, and itequals
zero otherwise. The omitted category is a firm financialcondition of fair,
The definitions, means, and standard deviations of the variablesused in the
empirical analysis are contained in Table 1.
Preliminary examination of the arbitrators responses uncovered ar
interesting phenomena that is not apparent from the informationin table 1 and19
that fundamentally affects the empirical &nalysis. Of the 122 conventional
arbitration awards that were analyzed, fully 389 (25.67.) were exactly equal to
either the union's or the management's last offer.All but 8 of the 64
arbitrators had at least one award that was equal to one of the offers. A
reasonable explanation for this is based on the property of the scenarios that
they were designed arbitrarily without regard for the plausibility of the
'1
offersvis a vis the facts."' In those situations where the offers were
skewed relative to the facts (both very low or both very high), the
arbitrators often seemed to feel constrained not to stray outside the
boundaries set by the offers though they were free to do so.23 In some cases
the arbitrators did not feel so constrained.In 196 cases (for 31
arbitrators) the award lay outside the boundaries. While not analyzed in
detail, the pattern of awards within arbitrators suggests that some
arbitrators are very reluctant to make an award outside the boundary. These
arbitrators had a relatively large number of cases on the boundary. Other
arbitrators felt relatively free to make awards outside the boundaries, and
they had few cases on the boundaries. Only two arbitrators were never on a
boundary or outside the boundaries.
With regard to the analysis of arbitrator decision making, the issue of
why some arbitrators are more likely to make awards outside the range of the
offers is a complicating factor that will not be addressed in any detail here.
Indeed, such extreme cases are likely to occur only rarely if at all in actual
22. If actual data were used it is unlikely that offers that were so
pathological' relative to the facts would be observed. They only occur here
because of the independent variation of the facts and the offers. This
independent variation is an important strength of the data used here.
23. In terms of the loss function, this suggests that there are
discontinuities at the boundaries that make it more costly to venture outside
in some situations2 t:
practice.The approach taken is to develop anappropriate econometric
specification that accounts for whenarbitrators in conventional arbitration
will be either on a boundary or outsidethe boundary without specifying which
of these conditions hold. This approach,
discussed in detail in the next
section, allows us to proceed withthe analysis of the decision processesof
arbitrators where there is a "normal'configuration of the facts and offers
without confounding the analysiswith the boundary problem.
V. The Empirical Specifct9P
In order to implement the models
of arbitrator choice outlined in
sections II and III, a specification
of the arbitrator's notion of an
appropriate settlement in eachform of arbitration is required.Denote the
appropriate awards in conventionaland final—offer arbitration by ecand
respectively. These must be based onlyon the facts of the caseand not on
the offers of the parties. Convenientspecifications are




where X represents a vector ofvariables reflecting the facts, cand
represents vectors of parameters,and Cc and Cf are stochastic components
representing unmeasured factorsaffecting ec and Yf respectively.
The
vector X includes a constant and
variables measuring 1) the rate of inflation;
2) negotiated settlements in comparablesituations 3) the differential
between the local wage for comparablework and the present wage; 4) the
differential between the national wage inthe industry and the present wage;
5) the logarithm of the present wageand 6) the financial condition of the21
Co(Ti pany
The Criterion function for choosing the management offer in final—offer
arbitration, Contained in equation (6), can be written after substituting from
equation (8) for V as
ef
(9) =(V+y )/2 —Xf
—
Cf.
The management's offer is selected if
(10) C. < (V ÷Y )12 —X.
u in
and the union's offer is selected otherwise. Assuming a normal distribution
with zero mean for €f the analysis of final offer arbitration awards is a
simple probit Note that, unlike the usual probit analysis, the variance of
is identified due to the fact that the average offer enters the criterion
function with a known coefficient (=1).
The empirical analysis of conventional arbitration awards is more
complicated due to the boundary problem. assuming an additive error, the
general model that relates V and the offers to the optimal conventional
arbitration award, contained in equation (3), can be rewritten as
(11) =''ec
+(l—)[&V+(1—&)V]+i.
where Vis the value of V in conventional arbitration and 11 is a stochastic
component representing unme:sured factors affecting After substitution
from equation (7) for Y this relationship is
ec
(12) = + (i-)EY+(1-&)Y] +
s c m u c
where 'andC refer to the values of P and C for conventional arbitration.
C C
Afinal quantity that needs to be specified for the analysis of conventional
arbitration awards is the weighting function that determines )'.Thisis
specified as the simple linear function
(13) = + )F — V1
0 1 U in
where and are parameters to be estimated. The notion that the relativeweiQht on the facts is larger when the offers are farther apart is embodied in
this specification as a positive value for i.
Specification of the optimal arbitration award as a continuous function
of Yand the offers is not consistent with the bunching of arbitration
ec
awards at the boundaries under standard assumptions renardinQ the
distributions of the random components ( and )).It also seems clear that
the specification of the optimal arbitration award defined in equation (11) is
valid only for awards that lie between the offers. Where Yis on a boundary
or outside the range defined by the offers! a different process determining
may prevail. What is required is an empirical specification that accounts for
when an award will be on the boundary or outside and hence, determined by a
different (unspecified) process.
n appropriate statistical model is based on the notion that the process
that determines in equation (11) is censored in that the process is only
observed if 'ec is interior to the offers.24 In this context, the decision
process of arbitrators can be thought of as a sequential process. The
arbitrator formulates a notion of an appropriate settlement and compares
this to the offers.If the offers surround V(V <V <V ) then the
ec inec U
arbitrator makes an award that is the function of Vand the offers defined
ec
in equation (11).If the offers do not surround Vthen the arbitrator makes
ec
an award on some basis that is not articulated here except that it is either
on a boundary or outside the boundaries defined by the offers This
alternative decision process does not have to be the same for all arbitrators
24. This is only one of a number of potential censoring processes that
could be used. Other specifications were tried, and the results were
qualitatively similar. The approach presented here provided the best fit to
the data.23
or all cases, The key is that little structure is iiTposed on the data for
these observations, The data on the actual arbitration award (Y )is used for c
theseobservations only to the extent that they have information about the
relationship between Vand the offers.
More formally, the quantity is observed only if is interior to
the offers, and in this case is equal to the actual arbitration award (V).
On the other hand, if Y__ is less than or equal to Y_ then the actual
ill
arbitrationaward is less than or equal to V. Similarly, if Yis greater
than or equal to Y then the actual arbitration award is greater than or equal
to V .Essentially,the unobserved value of Vis used in determining
u ec
whether an arbitration award corresponding to the process defined above is
observed. Thus, V is censored based on the value of Vrelative to the
s ec
offers.
The next step is to derive the probabilities associated with observing
V of a given value. The probability of observing an award that is less than
or equal to the management offer is
(14) Pr(Y V ) Pr(V￿ V ) =Pr(S￿ V —X ), s m ec c ni c
Similarly,the probability of observing an award that is greater than or equal
to the union offer is
(15)Pr(V ￿ V ) Pr(V? V )Pr( ? Y -X ).
s u ec u c u c
Finally, the joint probability density of observing an award that is between
the offers and that has a value equal to is24
(16)Pr(Y<Y<Y, y5=y) =Pr(Y<Y <Y,
=Pr(V—X <C <V —X ,M+'€: —C1X+(1—flE&V +(1—&)Y ]}).
m c cu c c s C m u
In other words, for all observations it is known in what range the value of
and hence C, falls. However, Y, and hence 4-€,isobserved only if
Vis between the offers.
ec
The key to the test of the model of arbitrator behavior is an analysis
of how close the arbitrator's notions of an appropriate award (Vand V
ec ef
are in the two types of arbitration.It is assumed throughout this analysis
that the random components of the model (CcS CfS and )) are distributed as a
trivariate normal. Although Vand Vare not observed directly, their
ec ef
relationship with the facts can be estimated. More formally, the hypothesis
that P=Pf can be tested directly.In addition, the correlation between the
unobserved components affecting Vand V(C and can be estimated.
Er ef c +
However, it is not possible to apply a standard test for the equality of these
random variables because equality implies equal variances along with unit
correlation5 and the latter is on the boundary of the parameter space.
In order to examine the congruence between Vand V ,fourversions of
ef
a joint model of arbitrator choice are estimated. The most general
unconstrained model allows and to have distinct values while allowing
for correlation between the three unobservables in the model (C, E, and J).
The likelihood function for this model is derived from the joint probabilities
of four distinct events under the assumption of trivariate normality of the
errors.25 LettingYf represent the arbitration award in final offer
2. Note that there are a total ofsixconceptually possible events.
However, two of these events are clearly pathalogical in some way, and these
probabilities are not specified here, One is the case where the conventionalarbitration and Y represent the conventional arbitration award, the first is
the joint probability that the conventional award is less than or equal to the
management final offer and the final—offer award is equal to the management
final offer. This probability is
(17)Pr(Y Y ¶YY ) =Pr(CY —X C <E'( +y )/2—Xp ) s inSiin c inc + u in +
The joint probability that the conventional award is greater than or equal to
the union final offer and the final offer award is equal to the union offer is
(18)Pr(Y Y ,VV ) =Pr(C￿Y—X ,C>[Y 4-V ]I2—X ).
s us+ u c u c I ii in I
Next, the joint probability that the conventional award lies between the
offers and is equal to V and the final—offer award is equal to the management
offer is
(19) Pr(V <\ <f yV
in5 US Ssi in
= Pr(V—X <C <V —XP ,)+' V—U'X +(1—1)[&V +(1—&)Y H,
inc c u c c s c in U
C<CV +j ]I2—X ).
furn +
Finally, the joint probability that the conventional award lies between the
offers and is equal to and the final—offer award is equal to the union
offer is
award is less than or equal to the management offer while the final—offer
award is equal to the union offer. The second is where the conventional award
is greater than or equal to the union offer while the final—offer award is
equal to the management offer. There were eight such cases in the original
sample, and it was decided that they were most likely the result of response
error.These observations were deleted from the sample used for estimation.26
(20)Pr(Y<y yy =y* y y
ins u ss'sf u
=Pr(Y—X <C <Y—XP , CY _{1xs+(1fl[óY+(1—)Y H, m C C U C C S C in U
>[y +y ]/2—X ). f u in f
In the next section, maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of this
model are presented. These parameters include 10
6, and the six
elements of the covariance matrix of the errors.
The second version of the model to be estimated is a constrained model
(constrained *1) where V Yin all respects Essentially, it is assumed ec ef —
thatPPf and that C E. Denote the constrained value of P and P by ,
anddenote the constrained value of Cand Cf by C.It is straightforward to
show that the probability of the first event, that the conventional award is
less than or equal to the management offer and the final-offer award is equal
to the management offer is
(21)Pr(Y Y ,V=Y ) =Pr(C￿Y—XP). s inSf in m
The probability of the second event, that the conventional award is greater
than or equal to the union offer and the final—offer award is equal to the
union offer is
(22)Pr(Y V ,V V )Pr(€Y —XP). s usf u m
Next, the joint probability that the conventional award lies between the
offers and is equal to and the final—offer award is equal to the management
offer is27
(23)Pr(Y<V <VV =Y, y _\I
ms us s st in
=Pr(Y—XP<€<EY +Y ]/'—Xf, )4+'€&{ —{X+(1—)E&Y+(1—&)Y3))
in U in S Ifl U
Finally,the joint probability that the conventional award lies between the
offers and is equal to and the final—offer award is equal to the union
offer is
(24) Pr(V <V <V ,V=Y4, y y
ins u s ssf u
= p+'C=Y—X±(1—)')t&V+(1—&)YJ}),
Given the assumption of joint normality of the errors, the likelihood function
of this madel can be derived from these probabilities. The maximum likelihood
estimates of the parameters of this model (,1, 6, and the three
elements of the covariance matrix ofand )4) are presented in the next
section.
The third specification of the model is a constrained version
(constrained #2) of the general model, defined in equations (17) —(20),where
no correlation is allowed between and either €c or IL.However, c and
are allowed to differ. This is equivalent to estimating the models of
conventional and final—offer arbitration separately. In other words, these
estimates can be derived from a simple probit model of arbitrator choice in
final offer arbitration and the model of arbitrator decision making in
conventional arbitration that is defined in equations (14) —(16).These can
be thought of as the models based on the marginal distributions of the
underlying random variables. The maximum likelihood estimates of the
parameters of this model (,, Y0,1, 6 and the Four free components of28
the covariance matrix oftheerrors) are presented in the nextsection.
The final specification of the model is a constrained version
(constrained $3) of the general model, defined in equations (17) —(20), where
=p but where is allowed to differ from thouqh correlation is allowed cf c
-
for. Thiscan be interpreted as assuming that the systematic determinants of
Vand Vare identical while the random components may differ. An
ec ef
alternative interpretation is that V Yin all respects while there is an ec ef
additional error component in the final—offer decision rule that causes a
deviation from a strict comparison between the average offer and Y. The
maximum likelihood estimates of the parameters of this model (,'' 6,
and the six components of the covariance matrix of the errors) are presented
in the next section.
Note that the sample design seems to be a natural for application of an
error components model of some sort. There are multiple observations for each
arbitrator, and it is known that the arbitrators differ systematically in
their awards (Bazerman, in press).If these systematic differences are not
accounted for, the inferences based on the estimates will not be reliable due
to the correlation that is induced between the stochastic terms across cases
for a particular arbitrator. One approach to accounting for this correlation
in the likelihood function is to assume that arbitrators differ systematically
in their mean values of an appropriate award in both conventional and
final—offer arbitration. This is equivalent to an error components structure
26
on C. This structure can be accommodated by including a vector of
26. In the conventional arbitration model there is more than one error (C
and J4) so that assuming systematic differences across arbitrators in V is not
the only possible solution. For example, another approach would be toBassume
that the mean value of ,ti varies systematically across arbitrators (an errors
components structure on ,U).Yet a third approach would be to allow the29
specific dummy variables in the data vectors determining 'ec arid
It is not likely that the introduction of fixed effects will change the
estimates or the inferences substantially. This is because each arbitrator
was given the same set of twenty—five cases so that the explanatory variables
28 (X, VV ) are the same for all arbitrators in each case. In this
in u
situation it can be shown for ordinary least squares (OLS) models that the
estimates derived without fixed effects are identical to those obtained when
fixed effects are included. In addition, it can be shown that the standard
errors derived from models including fixed effects must be smaller than those
derived from models without fixed effects.29 Thus, any hypothesis testing
done on the basis of OLS estimates without fixed effects will be conservative.
While these results are not precisely true for the nonlinear model proposed
here, they are likely to be approximately true.
The results reported in the next section are for specifications which do
not include fixed arbitrator effects. With the exception of the fully
unconstrained model, all of the models have been estimated including fixed
decision processes of arbitrators to differ more generally. Bazerman (in
press) presents an analysis of the formulation of awards under conventional
arbitration that accounts for differences between arbitrators in a number of
di inensi ons.
27. There are 25 observations for most arbitrators so that the standard
problem of inconsistency in nonlinear fixed effect models due to small numbers
of repeat observations is not likely to be a serious problem. random
effects specification was considered. However, evaluations of very high order
normal CDFs would be required, and the computational burden was deemed
excessi ye.
28. This is not precisely true due to the fact that there are some missing
observations.
29. The analysis of errors components models in this context is formally
identical to the well known seeminqly—unrelated—regressjon problem. Note that
these considerations are independent of whether, in fact, the fixed effects
differ significantly across arbitrators.30
effects.0 While the hypothesis that the fixed effects are equal could be
rejected in all cases, the estimates of the parameters of interest and their
asymptotic standard errors were virtually identical to the estimates derived
without fixed effects.In addition the qualitative nature of the outcomes of
thetests of the competing models were not affected by the inclusion ofthe
fixed effects.
VI. The Empirical Results
The first two columns of table 2 contain the maximum likelihood
estimates of the unconstrained joint model of arbitrator decision making in
conventional and final—offer arbitration. The definitions of the relevant
variables are contained in table 1. ll of the estimates presented in this
section were derived using the optimization algorithm described by Berndt,
Hall, Hall, and Hausman (1974). The estimates of the model are plausible in
the sense that all of the parameters have the expected sign and are
asymptotically significantly different from zero at conventional levels. The
general framework of the conventional arbitration award process is supported
by the data. The weight on ec relative to the offers U') is large so that
the arbitrator pays primary attention to the facts, but the weight is
sensitive to the quality of the offers in the sense that as the offers get
30. Estimation of fixed effects in the fully general model would require
the estimation of an additional 126 parameters in a single model. The
computational burden proved to be excessive. Constrained model *2 also
required the estimation of 126 extra parameters, but the estimation could be
split into two pieces.
31. Bazerman and Farber (in press> discuss a similar set of estimates in
detail with regard to their implications for arbitrator behavior in
conventional arbi tration.farther apart the weight on Vincreases (Ii>O). The weight on the
management offer relative to the union offer is significantly larger than
3., .5. —
Theestimates of P and are very similar so that their qualitative
properties can be discussed without making any distinction. The differential
between wages negotiated by workers in comparable situations and the present
wage (COMP) has a large positive effect on V. The differential between wages
in the local (occupationally defined) and national (industrially defined)
labor markets and the present wage (LW and NW respectively) have positive but
smaller statistically significant effects on Y. The effect of LW is larger
than that of NW.It is interesting that the level of the present wage has a
small positive coefficient, although it is not significantly different from
zero at conventional levels. To the extent that this coefficient is positive,
the implication is that arbitrators act not only to ratify the existing
proportional wage structure but also to widen the existing differentials
somewhat. Finally, the financial condition of the company has an asymmetric
effect on the arbitration award. The omitted category for the dummy variables
are situations where the company is in Imiddlingu condition.If the company
is in worse condition (CONDB), the arbitrators made awards which were 2 to 2—
1/2 percentage points lower on average. On the other hand, if the company
were in better condition, the arbitrators made awards which were about 1/2 of
32. While there is no clear interpretation of this result, it may suggest
that a richer weighting scheme is needed where not onlybut also & depends
on the quality of the offers. For example, it may be the case that & depends
on the relative distances of V and V from V .Somealternatives were
investigated, but the einpiricaT impliations gthesevariations are so
similar to the model estimated here that it was difficult to distinguish
between the different specifications with any precision. See Bazerman and
Farber (in press).— n
apercentage point higher on average. The hypothesis that thecoefficients on
CONDG is oequalmagnitude but opposite sign to the coefficient on CONDB can
be rejected at any reasonable level ofsignificance.3
The central issue is how close Vand Vare. The first column of
ec ef
table 3 contains estimates of constrained model *1 where it isassumed that
'ec'ef in all respects.The specific constraints along with the log—
likelihood values of the unconstrained and all of the constrainedmodels are
summarized in table 4.It is not possible to perform a classical likelihood—
ratio test of constrained model *1 against the unconstrainedmodel due to the
fact that one of the constraints is that cf=1 which is onthe boundary of the
parameter space. Nonetheless, some feel can be gainedfor how well the
constrained model performs by noting that the log—likelihood valuefor this
model is 1536.6 as compared with 1617.3 in the unconstrainedmode1.4 The
implication is that Vand Vdiffer in ways that degrade the fitof the
ec ef
constrained model substantially.
it is useful to examine exactly how V and ef differ. One possibility
is that and differ substantially. The last column of table 2 contains
the estimated differences between c and computed from the estimates of the
unconstrained model along with their asymptotic standard errors. All of these
differences are small when compared to the magnitude of the coefficients
themselves. Only the coefficients of CUNDB differ significantly at
conventional levels, and only one other difference (COND6) exceeds its
33. This hypothesisisequivalent to the hypothesis the the two
coefficientssumto zero. Using the coefficients from conventional
arbitration this sum is —.0124 with an asymptotic standard error of .00338. A
similar result is derived using the coefficients from
34. Were the likelihood-ratio test valid, thehypotLsis that V Y
could be rejected at any reasonable level of significance.
ec estandard error. These results suqest that individual elements of and --
c f
do not differ siqnificantly based on their marginal distributions. However,
it is also important to examine the extent to which the joint hypothesis that
is supported by the data. Constrained model 3, whose estimates are
contained in the last columns of table 3 differs from the unconstrained model
only in imposing Alikelihood—ratio test of the hypothesis that
suggests that the hypothesis can be rejected at the .05 level of significance
but not at the .02w level.
Another diagnostic calculation for examining the degree of congruence
between and is to compute the difference between Y X and Y =XB for
f c ef f ec c
each scenario based on the estimates of and from the unconstrained
model. Table 5 contains the estimates of V ,Vand their difference for
ef ec
each of the twenty—five scenarios. The asymptotic standard errors are also
presented. The results are quite clear. For only four scenarios is the
difference between Vand Vsiqnificantly different from zero at ef ec -
36 conventional levels. Overall1 the evidence suggests that c and differ
to a minor and inconsequential extent.
The other way in which Vand Vcould differ is with regard to the ec ef
unobserved factors. The variance 6c differs from the variance ofE by
.000103 with an asymptotic standard error of .0000434 so that the hypothesis
that the variances are equal can be rejected at conventional levels. At the
same time a very high correlation is estimated between E•c and The
estimate of cf is 818 with a very small asymptotic standard error. The
35. The teststatistic is —2(1617.3—1608.6)=17.4. This statistic is
distributed as X with 8 degrees of freedom. The critical values of this
distribution at the .05 and .025 levels are 15.5 and 17.5 respectively.
36. Careful examination of these four cases (4181921) did not reveal
any pattern that could be viewed as a common cause ofthedifference.34
hypothesis that Pf equals zero can be rejected at any reasonable level of
siqnificance. Thus, the unobserved factors that affect 'ec are highly
correlated with the unobserved factors that affect Y .Inorder to see how
ef
important this correlation is, a constrained model (*2) was estimated where
and are allowed to differ but where and are assumed to equal zero.
These are the estimates of the separate (marqinal) models of conventional and
final—offer choice, and they are contained in the second and third columns of
table 3.The log—likelihood of this model, which has only two constraints on
the unconstrained model, is 1445,7. Thus, the constraints are soundly
rejected at any reasonable level.Indeed, this model with two constraints
fits the data considerably more poorly than either constrained model *1 with
eleven constraints or constrained model *3 with 8 constraints. Of course, the
various constrained models, whose performances are summarized in table 4, are
nat nested appropriately, but this comparison does suggest that the
correlations between the unobserved factors are substantial.
While there is important correlation between and €f this correlation
is not perfect. It is not possible to test the hypothesis that fc1 directly
because of the boundary problem noted earlier, but we can pick a value
somewhat less than one and test that hypothesis. For example, the hypothesis
that fc95 can be rejected against the alternative that at any
reasonable level of significance. Note further that constrained model #1 is
nested in constrained model *3.Model *1 embodies the assumption that
but in all other respects is identical to model *3. The log—likelihood value
of model #1 is 1536.6 while the log—likelhood value of model *3 is 1608.6.
This comparison suggests that the errors are not, in fact, identical,
Overall it is clear that the unobserved factors affectinq Vand Y -ec ef
are correlated to an important extent.In addition, the observed determinants35
of Y and V have similar effects. The ability of the model to fit the ec ef
data is improved substantially by accounting for the correlationbetween the
errors, and the performance does not degrade very much by imposing the
constraint t*3) that
VII. Implications of the Analysis
The results presented in the previous section imply that there isa
substantial amount of consistency between the decision models of arbitrators
in conventional and final offer arbitration. In conventional arbitration it
was argued that arbitrators make awards that are weighted averages of some
notion of what is appropriate based on the facts (Y) and the offers of the
parties where the weights depend on the quality of the offers. This behavior
is consistent with the arbitrator attempting to minimizea loss function that
is the weighted sum of squared deviations of the award from eachparty's
notion of an appropriate award and from the offers. In final—offer
arbitration it was argued that the arbitrators choose the offer that is
closest to some notion of an appropriate award based on the facts'ef This
behavior is consistent with the arbitrator attempting to minimizea loss
function that is the sum of squared deviations of the award from eachparty's
notion of an appropriate award.
The results strongly support this framework. The conventional
arbitration awards do seem to be a weighted average of the facts and the
offers where the weights are dependent on the quality of the offers.In
addition, the facts all influence Vin a plausible and siqnificant fashion. ec
The final offer awards are determined by a comparison of the facts withthe
average offer, and the value of that is implicit in this process is36
determined in plausible and significant ways by the facts. More importantly,
the quantities Vand Vare affected virtually identically by the facts
ec ef
and the unobserved factors affecting and are highly
correlated. While it is not possible to conclude that thearbitrator uses
exactly the same notion of an appropriate award in makingdecisions in both
types of arbitration, the evidence is quite compellingthat the arbitrators
are generally consistent in their behavior.
This consistency in arbitrators views of an 'appropriate"award has a
number of implications for understanding arbitrationand collective
bargaining. First, these results provide convincingevidence that arbitrators
determine an appropriate award without reference to the particularform of
arbitration in effect. The results further indicate that the appropriate
award can be defined based on the facts of the case, independentboth of the
political and structural influences of the particulararbitration procedure
and of the final offers of the parties. Next, the validity of thismodel of
arbitrator behavior suggests a sound basis for comparing the qualityof
agreements under alternative forms of arbitration against an independent
definition of quality. That is, the agreements reached under the threatof
conventional versus final—offer arbitration (whether negotiated orarbitrated)
can be compared to the appropriate award as defined bythe facts of the case.
While critics of conventional arbitration argue that it chills bargaining,
critics of final—offer arbitration argue that it often results in unacceptable
arbitration awards. The model developed and tested in this study provides a
basis (the appropriate award) for judging the appropriateness of theoutcomes
of the two systems.
potential reservation relates to how qeneralizable theseresults are
given that they are based on awards in hypothetical cases. 0+ course, having37
actual arbitrators making the awards is an important factor militating in
favor of broader applicability.In addition, the general advantages of using
data from simulations are important. The facts are controlled and measured
precisely, and the offers are observed even in cases of conventional
arbitration. On the other hand, the simulations suffer from the fact that the
situations are artificial by definition and that the arbitrator does not have
the same range of information available that is available in actual cases. In
sum, it is impossible to be sure that the Judgments of arbitrators in
simulated cases are consistent with those they would make in actual cases.
Nonetheless, the internal consistency of the responses of the arbitrators
across types of arbitration demonstrated in the analysis contained in this
study suggests that there is a great deal of information in these simulations
that can make an important contribution to understanding the behavior of
arbitrators.
Another potential reservation is related to the fact that arbitrators
were asked to render a final—offer iudgement immediately after making a
conventional award. This may imply that the final—offer awards are
"contaminated11 and the analysis will be biased in favor of finding
similarities between Yand Y While this might be worrisome, the
ef ec
advantages of this approach must be weighed against the potential problems.
If in each case an arbitrator was only required to make either a conventional
or a final—offer award (but not both) as specified by the investigator, only a
limited version of the analysis here would be possible.It would still be
possible to coapare c and ft'f but no estimates of the correlation between the
unobservabies affectinq Vin conventional and final—offer arbitration (C
e c
and tf)wouldbe possible. Identification of this correlation requires
observation of awards in the same case bythesame arbitrator for both types38
of arbitration.
Overall, substantial proQress has been made in arlalyzinQ the decision
processes of arbitrators. Not only were distinct models of arbitrator
behavior in conventional and final—offer arbitration identified, but a
substantial deqree of underlying consistency was found in the constructs
arbitrators use to make decisions in different settings. In addition, the
study has demonstrated the value of using data derived from carefully designed
simulations in analyzing the behavior of arbitrators. A number of areas for
further research are apparent. For example, since the arbitrator decision
process is likely to be central to the process of collective bargaining where
arbitration is the dispute settlement mechanism it would be useful to
integrate the results of studies such as this into theoretical and empirical
analysis of bargaining in an environment that includes arbitration. Finally,
it is clear that arbitrators differ in their decision processes, and it would
be useful to investigate both the degree to which there are such differences
and how these differences affect the bargaining process.39
REFERENCES
Anderson,John C. and Thomas A. Kochan."ImpasseProcedures in the Canadian
Federal Service," IndustrialandLabor Relations Review30(April 1977):
282—301.
Ashenfelter, Orley and David E. Bloom. 'Models ofArbitratorBehavior: Theory
andEvidence,'Aericar, Econoic RevieN 74 (March 1984): 111—124.
Bazerman, Max H. and Henry S. Farber, "Arbitrator Decision Making: When are
Final Offers Important?" industrial and Labor Relations Review, in
press,
Bazersnan, Max H. "Norms of Distributive Justice in Interest Arbitration,"
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, in press.
Berndt, Ernst K., Bronwyn H. Hall, and Robert E. Hall."Estimationand
Inference in Nonlinear Structural Models," Annalsof Economic aridSocial
Measurement 3/4(1974):653—665.
Bloom, David E. and Christopher L. Cavanaugh. 1'An Analysis of the Selection of
Arbitrators,"Harvard University, Department ofEconomics. rnimeo (June
1984).
Bonn, R. L. "Arbitration: An Alternative System for Handling Contract Related
Disputes," AdministrativeScience Quarterly 17(1972): 254—264.
Crawford, Vincent P. On Compulsory Arbitration Schemes," Journal ofPolitical
Economy 87 (February 1979): 131—159.
Farber, Henry S. "An Analysis ofFinal—OfferArbitration," Journal ofConflict
Resolution(December1980).
Farber, Henry S. "Splitting—the—Difference in Interest Arbitration,"
Industrialand Labor Relations Review 35(April1981);70—77.
Farber,Henry S. and Harry C. Katz. "Interest Arbitration, Outcomes, and the
Incentive to Bargain." Industrial andLaborRelations Review33(October
1979): 55—63.
Feigenbaum, Charles. "Final Offer Arbitration: Better Theory Than Practice,"
industrialRelations 14(October 1975): 311—317.
Feuille, Peter. "Final Offer Arbitration and the Chilling Effect," Industrial
Relations14 (October 1975): 302 —310.
Sallagher, Daniel and N. D. Chaubey. "Impasse resolution and Tn—Offer
Arbitrationin Iowa,' industrialRelations 21(Spring 1982): 129—148.
Kochan,Thomas A. and Jean Baderschneider. "Determinants of Reliance on
Impasse Procedures: Police and Firefighters in New York State."
Industrialand Labor Relations Review 31(July 1978): 431—440.40
Neale,Maraaret A. arid Max H. Bazerman. "The Role ofPerspectiveTaking
Abilityin Neqotiating Under Different Farms of Arbitration," Industrial
aridLaborRelations Rei'ie36(April1903): 378—3GB.
Northrup, Herbert R. CopulsoryArbitration arid Governpent Interventionin
Labor Disputes. Washington,D.C. Labor Policy Association, 1966.
Notz, William W. and Frederick A. Starke.FinalOffer versus Convnetional
Arbitration as Means ofConfilctManagement," AdministrativeScience
quarterly 23(June 1978): 189—203.
Starke, Frederick A. and William W. Notz. "Pre— andPost—Intervention Effects
of Conventional vs. Final Offer Arbitration," Academy olHanaqeent
Journal24(1981):832—850.
Stevens,Carl M. "Is Compulsory Arbitration Compatible with Bargaining?"
IndustrialRelations 5 (1966): 38—50.
Wheeler,Hoyt N. "Closed Offer; An alternative to Final—Offer Selection,"
IndustrialRelations 16(1977); 298—3(15.
Wheeler,Hoyt N. "How Compulsory Arbitration Affects Compromise Activity,"




PW log of present waae 2,08
(.392)
Y loq diff between award and .0966 S -
(.0242)
FDA proportion of FOA cases for Nanagenment .644
INF inflation rate .110
(.0285)
COMP comparable arbitrated settlements .100
(.0281)
LW log diff between local wage and PW .00960
(.101)
NW log diff between national wage and PW .00520
(.0214)
CONDB 1 if company in terrible or poor shape .405
COND6 =1 ifcompanyin good or excellent shape .398
MED log diff between man. final offer and PW .0729
(.0289)
UFO log diff between union final offer and PW .140
(.0282)
AFO log diff between ave. final offer and PW .107
(.0252)
DFD log difference between final offers .0673
(.0271)
N=1522Table 2:
Estimates ofExplicitModels ofArbitratorDecisions: Unconstrained Model
Conventional Final—offer
Determinants of V ()
Constant .0263 0300 —.00366
00575) ( .00755) ( . 00690)
INF .194 .216 —.0241
(.0243) (.0311) (.0296)
COMP .434 .416 .0180
(.0225) (.0341) (.0329)
LW .0246 .0291 —.00455
(.00650) (.00822) (.00799)
NW .266 .279 —.0134
(.0311) (.0504) (.0477)
PW .00306 .00328 —.000196
(.00191) (.00256) (.00241)
CONDB —.0190 —.0256 .00660
(.00182) (.00280) (.00246)

















p .818 cf (.0329)
ln(L) 1617.3
Note:The numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard errors. Pis the
correlation between 8 andp
refers to the correlation betwen )4 and
either C or depending on the column. N1522Table 3;
Estimates of Explicit Models of Arbitrator Decisions; ConstrainedModels
Constrajnd *1 Constrained #2 Constrained *3
CONY FDA CONY FDA CONY FDA
Determinantsof V ()
-e
Constant .0280 .0273 .0279 .0277
(.00538 (.00554 (.00812) (.00543)
INF .196 .189 .237 .201
(.0226) (.0234) (.0342) (.0228)
CONP .425 .422 .448 .430
(.0212) (.0216) (.0411) (.0214)
LW .0256 .0231 .0391 .0260
(.00617) (.00623) (.00947) (.00604)
NW .239 .286 .268 .263
(.0294) (.0298) (.0605) (.0296)
PW .00334 .00318 .00179 .00308
(.00179) (.00186) (.00279) (.00180)
CONDB —.0214 —.0186 —.0274 —.0212
(.00172) (.00173) (.00342) (.00175)
CONDG .00620 .00624 .00370 .00574
(.00174) (.00175) (.00245) (.00175)
Weight on V (i')




Relative weight on the manaqement offer
6 .588 .618 .703
(.0200) (.0615) (.0372)
Covariance matrix
.000404 .000426 .000362 . 000449 . 000344
(.0000188) (.0000192) (.0000556) (.0000228) (.0000243)
.000113 .00000151 .0000114
(.00000470) (.000000825) (.00000395)
p —.223 270 0 .0593 —.408
(.0408) (.164) (.114) (.157)
p 1 0 cf
(.04) lntL) 16.6 l44.i l6UBô Note:The numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standarderrors. Pis the












constrained %2 P P 0
cf fJ.t
23 1445.7
constrained #3 P =Pcf
17 1608.6Table 5 Predicted values of Y ,Yand their Differences for Each Scenario
ec ef
Case V (V-Y ) Case V V (V-Y ef ec ef ec ef
1 .0922 0931 — .000935 14. 0938 .0942 —000413
00166) (00138)(.00155) ( 00242)(00173)(.00239)
2 0569 0595 — 00260 15.0968 101 —.00207
(.00269)(.00160)(.00272) (.00242)(.00150)(.00210)
3.0623 .0652 —.00291 16.0865 .0835 .00299
(.00200)(.00143)(.00207) (.00229)(.00179)(.00212)
4. 122 . 116 .00564 17. 0604 0611 —.000762
(.00213)(.00191)(.00181) (.00330)(.00197)(.00324)
5 .0996 .101 —.00117 18.0868 .0819 .00490
(.00225)(.00202) (.00196) (.00246)(.00189) (.00210)
6.0946 .0926 .00194 19.0791 .0740 .00509
(.00209)(.00157)(.00215) (.00256)(.00190)(.00212)
7 .0789 .0793 —.000421 20 .113 .111 .00224
00335)(.00192)(.00335) (.00233)(.00170) (.00231)
8.124 .124 .000750 21 .115 .109 .00592
00225)(.00165)(.00202) (.00246)(.00203)(.00207)
9 .0989 .0973 .00153 22.116 .114 .00180
(.00204)(.00164) (.00213) (.00239)(.00181) (.00225)
10 .0932 .0950 —.00174 23 .123 .121 .00156
(.00307)(.00148) (.00285) (.002S7)(.00175) (.00249)
11 .117 .113 .00369 24 .0891 .0868 .00228
(.00243)(.00200) C .00224) (.00276)(.00176)(.00278)
12 .0765 .0764 .0000704 25.119 .114 .00420
(.00451)(.00225) (.00459) (.00263)(.00175) (.00272)
13.0888 .0893 —. 000473 AVE..0954 .0942 . 00124
C. 00267) ( .00176) C. 00259) C. 00101)C. 000667)C. 00104)
Computed fromthe estimates of fi and c for the unconstrained model whose
estimates are in table 2. The numbers in parentheses are asymptotic standard
errors.